International Equity ADR

International Equity ADR © 2008 Harding Loevner 2008 Third Quarter Report 1 Annualized Returns; 2Inception Date: December 31, 1989 corresponds to that of the linked International Equity Composite; 3Annual Standard Deviation; 4The Benchmark Index; 5The Indices are net of foreign withholding taxes on dividends, interest income and capital gains. Please read the above performance in conjunction with the footnotes on the back page of this report. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Composite Performance (%) For Periods Ending September 30, 2008 Last Quarter Last 12 Months Three Ye ars1 Five Ye ars1 Ten Years1 Since Inception1,2 Volatility3 HL Intl Equity ADR (gross of fees) (16.45) (18.65) 6.19 13.14 8.46 8.74 14.66 HL Intl Equity ADR (net of fees) (16.60) (19.24) 5.40 12.27 7.63 7.84 14.53 MSCI All Country World ex-US4,5 (21.91) (30.32) 2.65 11.34 6.52 4.81 15.93 MSCI EAFE5 (20.56) (30.50) 1.12 9.69 5.02 4.03 16.19 Sector Exposure (%) Sector HL Intl ADR ACW ex-US Over/Under The Benchmark Health Care 18.4 6.7 Cons Staples 18.3 8.0 Info Technology 10.8 6.0 Cash 3.0 -- Energy 14.0 11.4 Industrials 9.7 10.3 Telecom Services 3.8 6.8 Cons Discretionary 4.6 8.6 Utilities 0.0 5.6 Materials 3.5 10.3 Financials 13.9 26.3 Sector and region allocations are supplemental information only and complement the fully compliant International Equity ADR Composite GIPS presentation. Regional Exposure (%) Region HL Intl ADR ACW ex-US Over/Under The Benchmark Europe ex-EMU 34.4 24.8 Other1 4.7 -- Cash 3.0 -- Europe EMU 23.7 25.7 Emerging Markets 15.4 18.5 Canada 4.3 7.4 Japan 11.9 16.4 Pacific ex-Japan 2.6 7.2     -10.0                -5                 0.0                5.0           10.0 -14.0         -7.0                0.0                  7.0                14.0 1 Includes countries outside the benchmark where some holdings are incorporated. -10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 Table of Contents Performance Summary page 2 Market Review page 2 Portfolio Attribution page 3 Outlook page 3 Portfolio Structure page 5 Portfolio Holdings & Facts pages 6 & 7 -14.0 -7.0 0.0 7.0 14.0 Market Review & Outlook Worst quarterly market • performance since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Stocks of financially-strong, • high-quality growth companies should deserve a premium. Dividend yields on equities • surpass yields on governmnet bonds in many developed markets. Portfolio Highlights Large exposure to Health • Care, emphasizing companies with high margins and low cyclicality. Looking to find bargains • in hard-hit sectors, seeking durable growth franchises. Actively seeking opportunities • in emerging markets following steep declines.

Harding Loevner International Equity ADR Performance Summary The International Equity ADR Strategy Composite lost 16.4% in the quarter, and has lost 18.9% for the year to date. The Composite outperformed the MSCI All Country World ex- US Index, which fell 21.9% in the quarter (net of foreign withholding taxes) and has declined 29.8% so far this year. Market Review Stocks turned in the worst quarterly performance since the third quarter of 1990—Iraq's invasion of Kuwait—as the US mortgage crisis infected other credit sectors and claimed new victims, culminating in September with the nationalization of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the US Treasury rescue of insurance giant AIG, and the emergency merger of Merrill Lynch, Washington Mutual Savings, and Wachovia Bank. The Lehman default at a stroke doubled the credit losses recognized so far by financial institutions around the world from this mortgage crisis. Panic ensued in the short-term money markets, after the Reserve Fund, the US' largest short-term money market fund, was forced by losses on Lehman debt to redeem shares below their ostensibly fixed one-dollar NAV ('breaking the buck'), and to restrict redemptions from sister funds. The Lehman default also bankrupted the private sector bank deposit insurance scheme in Germany, leading to capital calls on the surviving banks there. This, along with the near failure of AIG, which had large derivative liabilities to numerous European banks, led to deposit runs on banks from Ireland to India. Governments arranged the rescue of a number of major financial institutions, including the HBOS (UK), Fortis (Benelux), Dexia (France), Hypo Real Estate (Germany), and—lest we forget—Glitnir (Iceland).  The quarter ended on a panicked note, with the Treasury's $700 billion rescue program failing the first attempt at passage by the US House of Representatives, as ideological and regional fault lines became exposed.  There will have been further dramatic news by the time this reaches your mailbox. Debt markets were in turmoil, with US Treasury and other government 'risk-free' paper so ardently pursued in the flight to quality that stories emerged of investors accepting negative interest rates to park cash in T-Bills. With banks hoarding cash as depositors fled, the London-centered inter-bank lending market froze, with LIBOR interest rates reaching unprecedented spreads over Treasury Bills (the "TED spread"). Financial jargon aside, banks have rapidly become unwilling to lend to one another— normally considered a low risk activity—as distrust has gripped the global financial system. Withdrawals from money market funds led to a dramatic shrinkage of commercial paper issuance, causing chain-reaction liquidity issues all along the supply lines of industry. Spreads for longer-term debt widened since the beginning of the quarter in accordance with the debt's perceived riskiness, with investment-grade corporate bond spreads widening from around 100 to 176 basis points, while the JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond Index spread (EMBI) soared from 298 to 414 basis points.* While the headlines focused on the financial crisis, market action was also pronounced in the non-financial sectors as investors increasingly recognized that hopes of growth in emerging economies remaining resilient in the face of a US slowdown (the "de-coupling" argument) would not be realized. 2 Market Performance (%) Market                                  Trailing 12 Months          3Q 2008 USD USD Canada (18.4) (21.7) Germany (27.7) (20.6) Japan (26.9) (17.6) United Kingdom (31.4) (21.0) United States (12.2) (9.0) Europe EMU (31.1) (21.2) Europe ex-EMU (30.0) (20.3) Pacific ex Japan (34.6) (25.0) Emerging Markets (33.1) (26.9) MSCI All Country World ex-US (30.0) (21.8) Sector Performance (%) of the MSCI ACW ex-US Index Sector                                    Trailing 12 Months        3Q 2008 USD USD Consumer Discretionary (33.0) (16.3) Consumer Staples (16.3) (10.0) Energy (22.7) (32.4) Financials (35.3) (16.1) Health Care (13.1) (8.0) Industrials (36.4) (24.6) Information Technology (36.5) (23.2) Materials (36.3) (39.2) Telecom Services (25.1) (17.2) Utilities (15.7) (16.9) Source: Wilshire Atlas, MSCI Barra (as of September 30, 2008) Source: Wilshire Atlas, MSCI Barra (as of September 30, 2008) * Source: Bloomberg. Run date: October 13, 2008. Bold indicates companies held in the portfolio during the quarter.  The portfolio is actively managed; therefore holdings shown may not be current. They should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security. A complete list of holdings is available on page six of this report.

2008 Third Quarter Report Energy, commodity, and capital goods stocks—associated with fixed-asset investment in China and other developing countries—were dumped, while investors sought relative safety in the non-cyclical sectors of Health Care and Consumer Staples. Financials actually managed to perform better than the market, with the known (or, more accurately, the presumed) survivors among the largest institutions enjoying price rises in the quarter. Portfolio Attribution Good relative performance in the quarter was the result primarily of large overweight positions (relative to the Index) in Health Care and Consumer Staples, the two best-performing sectors this period, and a large underweight in Materials, the worst performing sector. Returns were also boosted by good stock selection in Information Technology, where our stocks fell roughly one-third as much as the sector overall. While our large underweight in Financials, which still comprises over 25% of the Index, was an advantage through mid-year, it was a negative this quarter as the sector finally rallied somewhat and performed better than the market overall. Following our fundamental investment philosophy, portfolio sector weightings are mainly a result of our bottom-up stock picking process that focuses on four primary company criteria: growth potential, competitive advantage, management quality, and financial strength. Outlook The severe declines that stock markets have sustained over the past twelve months leave prices at very attractive levels. Most valuation measures and risk aversion indicators are reaching the type of extreme levels akin to those found near the bottom of previous bear markets. Two in particular stand out to us: 1) Dividend yields on equities are now higher than yields on government bonds in nearly all developed markets, including Japan, most European markets, as well as Hong Kong and Singapore. In the US, equity yields are above the front end of the Treasury yield curve, so relative yield spreads are rising closer to those found in non-US markets. The story has been different in emerging markets, where government bond yields have risen as portfolio liquidation     has overwhelmed capital-market liquidity, but even there, dividend yields on offer have risen significantly. Given that dividends have a tendency to grow over time, dividend-paying equities are an increasingly attractive alternative to Treasury bonds for long-term investors. Such opportunities have been rare since the mid-1950s, when US and European dividend yields crossed below government bond yields for the first time since the Great Depression. 2) Measures of risk aversion (or fear), such as the VIX option-implied volatility index, have not just risen from the record lows seen in 2005 and 2006, but have breached prior peaks—often associated with market bottoms. Meanwhile, the liquidity risk meter, the 'TED' spread mentioned earlier that is a measure of risk aversion between banks, has exceeded the high set 20 years ago during the 1987 crash. 3 VIX Index ("Fear Index") ‡ 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 J a n - 9 0 J a n - 9 1 J a n - 9 2 J a n - 9 3 J a n - 9 4 J a n - 9 5 J a n - 9 6 J a n - 9 7 J a n - 9 8 J a n - 9 9 J a n - 0 0 J a n - 0 1 J a n - 0 2 J a n - 0 3 J a n - 0 4 J a n - 0 5 J a n - 0 6 J a n - 0 7 J a n - 0 8 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 Jan 1990 Jan 1991 Jan 1992 Jan 1993 Jan1994 Jan1995 Jan1996 Jan 1997 Jan 1998 Jan 1999 Jan 2000 Jan 2001 Jan 2002 Jan 2003 Jan 2004 Jan 2005 Jan 2008 Jan 2007 Jan 2006 Oct 2008 Dividend Yields vs. Bond Yields † Europe France Germany Hong Kong Japan Singapore UK US 5.02% 3.75% 4.77% 4.04% 4.58% 3.75% 4.16% 2.73% 2.27% 1.38% 4.79% 2.95% 5.52% 4.22% 2.95% 3.43% 0.00% 1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% 0.00% 1.00% 2.00% 3.00% 4.00% 5.00% 6.00% Europe France Germany Hong Kong Japan Singapore United Kingdom United States Dividend Yield Bond Yield † Source: Bloomberg. Run date: October 6, 2008. ‡ Source: Bloomberg. Run date: October 14, 2008.

Harding Loevner International Equity ADR That said, we have little doubt that the global financial crisis and the political dithering over how to solve it is now having severe effects on the underlying economy. It is important to remember that the current liquidity crisis has its roots in questions over bank solvency—investors are increasingly unwilling to rollover short-term deposits and loans because they fear that financial institutions do not have enough capital to absorb losses on loans, securities and derivatives positions, especially with major derivative counterparties defaulting. Those worries in turn stem from the sharp and as-yet-unchecked decline in value of the biggest category of collateral for bank loans everywhere: housing. This decline is occurring not only in the US, but also in other large economies, including the UK, Australia, and Spain, and probably also in property markets not commonly labeled "bubbles," such as China. The solvency questions that brought on the crises have radically and permanently changed the face of the banking industry in both the US and the UK. Similar change is likely in continental Europe, where banks have become even more dependent on short-term wholesale funding than US banks (apart from US investment banks). We are not yet able to predict the consequences for markets of that change, with one exception: we are quite willing to predict the end of the era of cheap and easy credit. If the resumption of normal lending will take longer than usual, it must follow that business activity itself will slide deeper, and take longer to recover, than in most previous cycles. At the most basic level, many smaller companies and consumers are experiencing almost total denial of credit, as banks take the dangerous step from tightening credit standards to conserving liquidity. Whereas bank loan officers have been increasingly unwilling to lend to less creditworthy borrowers ever since rising sub-prime delinquencies became apparent, they now seem unwilling or unable to extend new credit to anyone, as they scramble to reduce their short-term liabilities. On a broader scale, the higher interest rates charged to all non-sovereign borrowers will hurt the profit margins of any company that does borrow, even as revenues decline as orders are cancelled due to uncertainty or financial hardship amongst customers. Even provincial (or state) and municipal governments are experiencing severe difficulties in borrowing. This condition, normally self-limiting as the credit markets ease with central- bank liquidity injections, will last longer this time because of the severe damage inflicted on the financial system by the derivatives and securitizations that have brought both leverage and obscure linkages into the equation, sowing both surprise losses and institutional mistrust. Under these circumstances, companies that have cash on hand, whose businesses generate free cash, or whose earnings are less cyclical than most, will thrive. At the extreme, they will be able greatly to improve their competitive positions by acquiring competitors who were less prudent than they, such as we have seen with Nomura Group's acquisition of Lehman Brothers Asian and European businesses, with Wells Fargo's proposed acquisition of Wachovia Bank, or Santander's opportunistic acquisition of two savings banks in the UK, and just recently with Allianz' stake in US blue chip Hartford Insurance. In time, this will take place in many industries, not just among financials. We expect to see the returns for high-quality companies to continue to surpass those of low quality, as the crisis plays out in the real economy. The moves by monetary authorities to address at all costs the systemic breakdown in the global financial system are a key signal for us. We are looking for bargains in the rubble of markets. In keeping with other economic downturns precipitated by financial crises, this one does not seem likely to be a short- lived downturn. Growth will be scarce in the world as the effects of financial de-leveraging work their way through the global economy. At the same time, our focus on financial strength, on sustainable profit margins, and on high (un-levered) returns on capital should continue to be a source of advantage, as much within sectors as between sectors. The market has already begun to differentiate between companies with sustainable earnings— such as those in Health Care or Consumer Staples—from those where the illusion of sustainability has been created by years of globally-synchronized economic growth. The ripple effects of the global de-leveraging now underway are unpredictable, and the stocks of companies that exhibit financial strength and transparency deserve a premium. Our focus will include companies in emerging markets, where we are now seeing the denunciation of "decoupling" as myth. While quick to defend the long-term merits of many developing 4 TED Spread ‡ 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 Dec-84 Dec-85 Dec-86 Dec-87 Dec-88 Dec-89 Dec-90 Dec-91 Dec-92 Dec-93 Dec-94 Dec-95 Dec-96 Dec-97 Dec-98 Dec-99 Dec-00 Dec-01 Dec-02 Dec-03 Dec-04 Dec-05 Dec-06 Dec-07 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 Dec 1984 Dec 1985 Dec 1986 Dec 1987 Dec 1988 Dec 1989 Dec 1990 Dec 1991 Dec 1992 Dec 1994 Dec 1993 Dec 1995 Dec 1996 Dec 1997 Dec 1998 Dec 1999 Dec 2000 Dec 2001 Dec 2002 Dec 2003 Dec 2004 Dec 2005 Dec 2006 Dec 2007 Oct 2008 "Our focus on financial strength, on sustainable profit margins, and on high (un-levered) returns on capital should continue to be a source of advantage." ‡ Source: Bloomberg. Run date: October 14, 2008.

2008 Third Quarter Report economies, we have been steadfast skeptics of the view that they could escape the consequences of their export orientation when their largest customer(s) experienced an economic contraction. Evidence of that linkage is now piling up fast.  Meanwhile, risk premia in emerging market debt are also rising, as foreign investors are deserting any and all risk to get cash to their home bases. With the most severe declines being experienced by emerging market equities, companies domiciled there are likely to offer some of the best bargains. For one thing, corporates in emerging economies are cash rich and will be buyers of developed world assets at good prices. But the big story of the next decade will almost certainly be more saving and less consumption in the US (overwhelmingly the world's largest consumer market) and the opposite in more liquid developing economies. It may take longer than many expect for that to come to the fore, as reaction by Asian savers at times of crisis is usually to save more, but we believe it will happen. Portfolio Structure The salient aspects of company quality in the current quarter have been low leverage and non-cyclicality. We don't expect that to change in the near future. We had been looking at the Panic of 1907 as a possible analog to the current financial crisis. In the days when there was no US Federal Reserve, it was left to steely-eyed action by J. Pierpont Morgan to clear troubled assets off the balance sheets of failing "trusts" and brokers, and of their bank lenders, thereby restoring liquidity to financial institutions and the stock market and minimizing the impact on the broader economy. But students of economic history have pointed us toward an alternative historical comparison: the Panic of 1873, a financial crisis in which nobody was rescued, and there was no firm hand guiding the resolution. This earlier crisis led to a severe global downturn in which the only companies that thrived were those that had sufficient cash on hand, or found a way to procure it, to run their own businesses and, in many cases, to acquire distressed competitors who lost access to credit.  Thus far, perhaps, we are walking the edge between the 1907 crisis and the more destructive 1873 crisis. We have always had a strong preference for companies with low debt and high free cash flows, and our holdings reflect this. Nevertheless, given the current credit crisis, we have reviewed our holdings in greater detail for short-term financing needs that might prove difficult or harm margins in the current environment.  Nearly half of our non-financial holdings (by portfolio weight) have more cash than debt on their balance sheets. The portfolio has been significantly overweight Health Care, while remaining significantly underweight Financials and Consumer Discretionary.  We are intensely focused on the latter two sectors in search of durable, growing franchises that have been unfairly penalized by the market frenzy, but have made only modest purchases to date. With monetary authorities in both the US and Europe now fully engaged in solving the financial crisis, we are becoming less averse to Financials generally, and are more likely to increase our holdings than to indulge further the negative bias we have held toward the sector for the past few years. The survivors of this crisis will emerge with greater market shares and more entrenched competitive positions, which should allow them to earn attractive profits as the economy recovers. As the US financial rescue was being debated at the end of the quarter, we added to Erste Group Bank, the Austrian bank with consumer finance and asset management operations across the still-undeveloped banking markets of Central Europe. With consumer loan demand growing from a relatively low base in its core markets, we believe that Erste has far better fundamental growth prospects than most European financial companies, while its valuation has fallen in-line with the sector. We also bought a new position in HDFC Bank, in our view one of the best-managed private banks in India. We had sold HDFC in the first quarter to avoid the integration risk surrounding its acquisition of Centurion Bank, a deposit-rich rival. However, with the integration nearly complete, and with an enlarged deposit base and an improved valuation, we again find the risk- reward trade off presented by HDFC to be attractive. We reduced holdings of Energy (we began the quarter with nearly 17% in Energy) through partial sales of two Canadian companies, EnCana and Imperial Oil , but we added to our holding in Gazprom toward the end of the quarter when the Russian market decline turned into a rout. Given Western Europe's growing dependence on Russia for its gas, and Gazprom's unrivalled bargaining power over its customers, we expect that this company's strong cash flows and long-lived reserves will be prized once the market's current fixation on falling energy prices ebbs. Always wary of corporate governance risks in Russia, we continue to believe that investing alongside the Russian government as controlling shareholder provides a degree of alignment and protection from expropriation risks. The addition to Gazprom and the relative outperformance of our emerging market holdings leave us still somewhat below benchmark weight in emerging markets, although within our developed market holdings there are a number of companies— illustrated by our Financials purchases this quarter—with significant business in developing countries.  The potential for many companies domiciled in the developing world to emerge as global leaders in their industries or their regions over time is in our minds as we weigh the merits of strong businesses with battered stock prices against the shorter-term risks of weak governance and policy structures. 5 "The survivors of this crisis should emerge with greater market shares and more entrenched competitive positions, allowing them to earn attractive profits as the economy recovers."

Harding Loevner International Equity ADR Supplemental Information as of September 30, 2008 The portfolio is actively managed; therefore holdings shown may not be current. They should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security. 6 International Equity ADR Holdings (as of September 30, 2008) Sector/Company/Description Country End Wt. (%) Consumer Discretionary Panasonic - Electronics manufacturer Japan 1.4 Sony - Entertainment & media Japan 1.5 WPP Group -  Advertising & marketing          United Kingdom 1.8 Consumer Staples Bunge - Agri-business & food Bermuda 2.7 L'Oréal - Personal care products              France 3.1 Nestlé - Food & beverage Switzerland 4.2 Tesco - Food United Kingdom 3.3 Unilever - Branded products United Kingdom 2.9 Wal-Mart de México - Goods/food Mexico 2.8 Energy BG Group - Integrated gas United Kingdom 2.3 EnCana - Natural gas Canada 2.5 Gazprom - Natural gas producer Russia 3.0 Imperial Oil - Integrated petroleum Canada 2.0 Sasol - Energy South Africa 2.5 Schlumberger - Petroleum industry services              United States 2.3 Financials Allianz - Insurance Germany 2.0 DBS Group - Multi-service bank Singapore 1.1 Erste Group Bank - Money center & retail bank   Austria 2.6 HDFC Bank - Mortgage financing India 1.5 HSBC Bank - Universal bank United Kingdom 2.4 Mitsubishi Estate - Real estate & office leasing   Japan 1.7 Monex Group - Internet investment service    Japan 0.5 Nomura Group - Brokerage Japan 1.5 Swiss Reinsurance - Life & health reinsurer          Switzerland 1.1 Health Care Alcon - Eyecare Switzerland 3.0 Fresenius - Health care Germany 3.7 Novartis - Life sciences Switzerland 1.5 Novo-Nordisk - Biotechnology Denmark 3.9 Qiagen - Biotech & instrumentation               Germany 3.2 Roche - Pharma & diagnostics Switzerland 3.6 Industrials Atlas Copco - Industrial compressors & equip.          Sweden 2.6 Hutchison Whampoa - Conglomerate   Hong Kong 1.5 Komatsu - Construction equipment Japan 1.7 Kubota - Industrial & farm machinery             Japan 2.3 SKF - Roller bearing manufacturer                  Sweden 1.6 International Equity ADR Holdings (as of September 30, 2008) Sector/Company/Description Country End Wt. (%) Information Technology Dassault Systemes - CAD/CAM software        France 3.2 Ericsson - Wireless communications Sweden 1.2 Hoya - Optical glass Japan 1.3 SAP - Enterprise software German 3.3 Taiwan Semiconductor - Dedicated IC foundry    Taiwan 2.2 Materials Air Liquide - Industrial gas France 3.6 Telecom Services América Móvil - Cellular phone operator    Mexico 2.3 Telekom Indonesia - Telecommunications      Indonesia 1.6 Utilities No holdings

2008 Third Quarter Report Supplemental Information as of September 30, 2008 Percent weight figure shown is the average percent over the period. Contributors and detractors in order of contribution to portfolio. CONTRIBUTORS TO RETURNS Portfolio attribution and statistics are supplemental information only and complement the fully compliant International Equity ADR Composite GIPS presentation. The portfolio is actively managed; therefore holdings shown may not be current. They should not be considered recommendations to buy or sell any security. The complete list of holdings is available on page six of this report. Source: Wilshire Atlas (Run Date: October 6, 2008); Harding Loevner International Equity ADR Composite; MSCI Barra 7 Last Quarter Largest Holdings (%) Sector Weight Nestlé Consumer Staples 3.7 Novo-Nordisk         Health Care 3.7 Alcon Health Care 3.5 Roche Health Care 3.5 Air Liquide Materials 3.5 Last 12 Months Largest Holdings (%) Sector Weight Bunge Consumer Staples 3.7 Nestlé Consumer Staples 3.6 Air Liquide Materials 3.3 Novo-Nordisk Health Care 3.2 Sasol Energy 3.0 Largest Contributors (%) Sector Weight HSBC Holdings        Financials 2.0 SAP Information Technology 2.9 Alcon Health Care 3.5 Novartis Health Care 0.2 Danske Bank Financials 1.3 Largest Contributors (%) Sector Weight BG Group Energy 2.9 Alcon Health Care 2.7 Sasol Energy 3.0 EnCana Energy 2.7 HDFC Bank Financials 0.7 Largest Detractors (%) Sector Weight Bunge Consumer Staples 3.2 Komatsu Industrials 2.2 Novo-Nordisk Health Care 3.7 EnCana Energy 2.4 Gazprom Energy 1.5 Largest Detractors (%) Sector Weight Komatsu Industrials 2.4 Bunge Consumer Staples 3.7 Atlas Copco Industrials 2.8 Ericsson Information Technology 1.2 Erste Group Bank    Financials 1.8 Purchases Company Country Sector HDFC Bank India Financials Novartis Switzerland Health Care Sales Company Country Sector Danske Bank Denmark Financials Nitto Denko Japan Materials Portfolio Characteristics1 HL Intl ADR ACW ex-US Return on Assets 9.7 5.6 Return on Equity2 20.1 17.5 Std Dev of 5 Year ROE 3.2 3.7 Debt/Equity 28.4 39.3 Profit Margin 12.7 10.9 Sales Growth3 11.5 10.7 Earnings Growth3 16.5 15.8 CF Growth3 13.7 10.2 Dividend Growth3 9.0 9.0 Portfolio Characteristics HL Intl ADR ACW ex-US Avg Wtd Mkt Cap ($Mil) $46,375 $43,943 Price/Earnings4 14.0 10.8 Price/Cash Flow4 9.0 7.0 Price/Book4 2.0 1.6 Alpha5 2.03 -- Beta5 0.83 1.00 R-Squared5 0.95 1.00 Sharpe Ratio5 0.04 0.00 Standard Deviation5 13.97 16.42 1 Weighted median; 2Trailing one year; 3Trailing five years, annualized; 4Harmonic mean; 5Trailing three years, annualized.

HARDING LOEVNER LLC 50 Division Street, Suite 401 • Somerville, NJ 08876 • Tel (908) 218-7900 • Fax (908) 218-1915 • www.hardingloevner.com 2008 Third Quarter Report Fundamental. Thinking. Worldwide. 1 Benchmark Index; 2Asset-weighted standard deviation (gross of fees); 3N.A. - Internal dispersion less than a 12-month period; 4N.M. - Information is not statistically meaningful due to an insufficient number of portfolios in the Composite for the entire year. International Equity ADR Composite contains fully discretionary U.S. Dollar-based international equity accounts and for comparison purposes is measured against the MSCI All Country World ex-US Index (presented net of foreign withholding taxes since 2001, when the net index first became available). The exchange rate source of the benchmark is Reuters. The exchange rate source of the Composite is Bloomberg. Additional information about the benchmark, including the percentage of Composite assets invested in countries or regions not included in the benchmark, is available upon request. The MSCI All Country World ex-US Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index that is designed to measure equity market performance in the global developed and emerging markets, excluding the US. The Index consists of 47 developed and emerging market countries. The MSCI EAFE Index (Europe, Australasia, Far East) is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index that is designed to measure developed market equity performance, excluding the US & Canada. The Index consists of 21 developed market countries. You cannot invest directly in these Indices. Harding Loevner LLC has prepared and presented this report in compliance with the Global Investment Performance Standards (GIPS®). Harding Loevner is GIPS compliant and is verified by Ashland Partners & Company, LLP. Harding Loevner has received a firm-wide GIPS verification beginning November 1, 1989. The most recent verification was for the Quarter ending June 30, 2008. Harding Loevner LLC is an independent registered investment advisor. The firm maintains a complete list and description of composites, which is available upon request. Results are based on fully discretionary accounts under management, including those accounts no longer with the firm. Composite  and benchmark performance is presented net of foreign withholding taxes on dividends, interest income and capital gains. However, some custodians may claim a portion of the foreign withholding taxes, which would be reflected in the Composite performance. Assets with foreign withholding taxes regularly reclaimed are deemed to be an immaterial percentage of the composite assets. The MSCI All Country World ex-US Index range uses withholding tax rates applicable to Luxembourg. Additional information is available upon request. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Additional information regarding the policies for calculating and reporting returns is available upon request. The US Dollar is the currency used to express performance. Returns are presented both gross and net of management fees and include the reinvestment of all income. Actual returns will be reduced by investment advisory fees and other expenses that may be incurred in the management of the account.  The standard fee schedule generally applied to separate International Equity ADR accounts is 0.80% annually of the market value of assets up to $20 million; 0.40% of amounts from $20 million to $100 million; negotiable for amounts over $100 million. Actual investment advisory fees incurred by clients may vary. The annual composite dispersion presented is an asset- weighted standard deviation calculated for the accounts in the composite the entire year. The International Equity ADR Composite was created on August 31, 2000. Performance prior to August 31, 2000 is that of the International Equity Composite, which is managed similarly and materially represents the strategy of the International Equity ADR Composite. International Equity ADR Composite Performance (as of September 30, 2008) Intl ADR Equity (Gross) Intl ADR Equity (Net) MSCI ACW ex-US1MSCI EAFE Internal Dispersion2 Number of Accounts Composite Assets ($M) Firm Assets ($M) 2008 (YTD) (18.86) (19.30) (29.85) (29.26) N.A.399 214 4,693 2007 14.04% 13.24% 16.66% 11.17% 0.6% 109 252 6,356 2006 23.63% 22.69% 26.65% 26.34% 0.7% 80 153 4,720 2005 19.99% 19.04% 16.62% 13.54% 0.5% 52 99 2,562 2004 17.74% 16.79% 20.91% 20.25% 0.4% 49 89 1,524 2003 28.80% 27.72% 40.83% 38.59% 0.5% 55 86 1,357 2002 (15.67%) (16.31%) (14.96%) (15.94%) 0.5% 40 51 1,082 2001 (15.62%) (16.15%) (19.75%) (21.44%) N.M.4 9 11 1,154 2000 (14.90%) (15.71%) (15.09%) (14.17%) N.M. 1 2 1,392 1999 51.54% 50.44% 30.90% 26.96% 0.5% 56 1,230 1,423 1998 12.05% 11.26% 14.46% 20.00% 0.2% 64 977 1,372